He emphasized that, amid the global industrial trend of "Moving East to America," Taiwan must transition from being merely "Made in Taiwan" to being "Made with Taiwan," with technological collaboration at its core. "The goal is to let the world cooperate with Taiwan, not replace Taiwan," he stressed. He advises Taiwan to establish defenses and new advantages in two areas: establishing industrial parks in the U.S. based on Taiwanese experience, and building a Taiwan technological firewall and core technology protection. "As the global manufacturing and technology landscape is reshuffled, what Taiwan needs to do is not to follow one side or the other, but to build its own technological moat while strategically expanding its industry globally."
Immediately upon taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump introduced a "reciprocal tariffs" policy, imposing a 100% tariff on Chinese goods, and rolled out incentives for corporate repatriation. This aggressively promotes the "Made in America" strategy to revitalize domestic manufacturing and achieve the goal of "Make America Great Again."
Chen-Tso (Wesley) Chu is a Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and an Executive Advisor at the Stanford Taiwan Science and Technology Research Center. He also serves as the Secretary-General of the International Research Foundation for AI Law.
Chu pointed out that for Taiwan, "Made in America" is no longer just a political slogan. He observed that with TSMC's official commencement of mass production at its Arizona fabrication plant, the tangible progress of "Made in America" is rapidly taking shape. As the "Made in America Inaugural Year" begins and U.S.-China relations remain tense, the supply chain landscape is undergoing accelerated reorganization. Taiwanese enterprises find themselves at the critical nexus of the U.S.-China economic strategy.
Chu noted that since the 1980s, Taiwanese businesses have expanded westward into China, establishing a strong foothold in the global supply chain through manufacturing efficiency and flexible deployment. Entering the 2010s, as U.S.-China tech confrontation escalated, Taiwanese manufacturers successively adopted the "China Plus One" and "China Plus N" strategies, setting up factories in Southeast Asia, India, and Mexico. The success in the 2010s demonstrates the resilience of the Taiwanese industry, but it also means that geopolitical risks and production costs are rising simultaneously, forcing enterprises to re-examine their long-term investment strategies.
"Taiwan's challenge is not just to keep up with the pace of supply chain restructuring, but to ensure the security boundary of its own technology and legal system. The goal is to let the world cooperate with Taiwan, not replace Taiwan," Chu emphasized. He stressed that in the global industrial trend of "Moving East to America," Taiwan should transition from simple "Made in Taiwan" to "Made with Taiwan," which is centered on technological collaboration. By designing institutions and policies, Taiwan must ensure it maintains a dominant role and value-creation capability in the global industrial chain.
Chu suggested that Taiwan should work on two fronts to establish protection and new advantages: first, establishing industrial parks in the U.S. based on Taiwanese experience, and second, building a Taiwan technological firewall and protecting core technologies.
Regarding the establishment of industrial parks in the U.S. based on Taiwanese experience, Chu pointed out that the "AI Action Plan" released by the Trump administration in July 2025 lists three main pillars: encouraging innovation and relaxing regulation; building AI infrastructure; and promoting AI diplomacy and national security. The second pillar, "AI Infrastructure," is highly relevant to Taiwanese companies and is the core direction of the Made in America policy. However, there is currently a disconnect between federal policy and local implementation in the U.S. Although manufacturers like TSMC, Foxconn, Wistron, Quanta, Pegatron, and Delta Electronics have established facilities in Arizona and Texas, they commonly face difficulties related to water and electricity supply, environmental assessment, talent acquisition, taxation, and matching subsidies.
He stated, "A clear policy document, consistent with bilateral Taiwan-U.S. interests, should be established at the U.S. federal level to fill the localization gap with the concept of a 'Technology Industrial Park,' upgrading the strategic framework from 'Made in Taiwan' to 'Made with Taiwan.'" Chu believes this move would not only improve the operational efficiency of Taiwanese companies in the U.S. but also help capital flow back to Taiwan, forming a "dual market, double revenue" model, which would further enhance Taiwan's negotiation and capital advantages in the global industrial chain.
Concerning the establishment of a Taiwan technological firewall and core technology protection, Chu noted that with geopolitical tensions continuing to rise, "industrial hollowing out" has become a societal focus. He called for "Taiwan's technological protection should not only target specific countries, but should be Taiwan-centric, establishing a tiered, operational protection system."
Chu cited the case of Tokyo Electron (TEL) in Japan, which was suspected of stealing Taiwan's 2-nanometer key technology, illustrating that the risk of technology leakage is no longer limited to China. Currently, Taiwan's "technological firewall" consists of a two-tiered structure: the Trade Secrets Act and the National Security Act. The Executive Yuan released the "Regulations on the Identification of National Core Key Technologies" in April 2023, and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) has identified 32 core technologies so far this year.
Chu candidly stated that the standards for technology identification and the level of protection still lack transparency and practical operability. He suggested that the government should establish a tiered management system based on technology sensitivity, clearly authorize the scope of protection and responsibility mechanisms, thereby forming a "technological safety net" that combines law, industry, and capital, to safeguard Taiwan's economic security and national interests.
Chu observed that with the dual shifts in capital and supply chains, Taiwan's supply chain structure is ushering in a new era. Analysis from foreign institutional investors suggests that the Trump administration's aggressive tariffs and Made in America policies will continue to boost investment demand for AI chips, semiconductor equipment, and smart manufacturing sectors. In the short term, a new round of reshuffling will occur in the Taiwanese supply chain, with AI servers, advanced packaging, and automated manufacturing sectors becoming the focus of capital. In the long run, if Taiwanese companies can simultaneously deploy in both the U.S. and Asian markets, Taiwan is expected to reshape its advantages under the structure of "diversified risk and enhanced added value."
Chu emphasized, "As the global manufacturing and technology landscape is reshuffled, what Taiwan needs to do is not to follow one side or the other, but to build its own technological moat while strategically expanding its industry globally."


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