NOWnews
• International Center, Chen Cheng-chia / General Report

On the 2nd, the U.S. Congress's U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) held a hearing titled "The U.S.-China Undersea Competition." Jason Hsu, a former legislator and current Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, attended and delivered remarks.

Hsu stated that submarine fiber-optic cables are the backbone of the modern global economy, carrying approximately 97% to 99% of intercontinental internet traffic and supporting financial transactions, military communications, and cloud computing. Taiwan connects to the world through only 24 cables, comprising 14 international and 10 domestic lines. Taiwan's semiconductor industry relies heavily on a stable connection for transmitting design documents and overseeing manufacturing; any disruption would paralyze financial markets and sever critical military communications. Hsu warned that China has deliberately treated Taiwan's submarine cables as part of its expanding gray-zone warfare toolbox.

During the hearing, Hsu presented several key recommendations to the U.S. Congress:

Pass and fund the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Act (S.2222): This bill would establish a framework that includes advanced monitoring and detection capabilities, rapid response protocols for cable repairs, intelligence-sharing mechanisms with Taiwan, and cable hardening measures (such as deeper burial and more resilient materials). Provisions to counter China's gray-zone tactics through joint exercises, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative monitoring deserve urgent attention.

Fund an Indo-Pacific submarine cable monitoring network: Congress should appropriate funds to build comprehensive monitoring capabilities, integrating existing naval assets, new sensor deployments, satellite imagery, and allied intelligence to continuously monitor critical cable routes. This should include bilateral data-sharing agreements with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, building upon the Quad Cable Connectivity and Resilience Partnership launched in May 2023.

Invest in cable repair capabilities: Through the NEPTUNE Act and other legislation, Congress should authorize the procurement of cable-laying and repair vessels and deploy military and commercial repair capabilities in the Western Pacific. Taiwan's lack of indigenous repair vessels is a critical vulnerability, which the U.S. can help address.

Update international legal frameworks: Congress should direct the State Department to promote modernized international agreements to replace the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables. The new framework should establish clear guidelines, mandatory investigation and reporting requirements for cable damage, flag state accountability mechanisms, and robust enforcement provisions to address state-backed sabotage conducted through commercial proxies.

Authorize enhanced sanction powers: Congress should create authorities to sanction shipowners, operators, flag state registries, and entities providing material support for cable-cutting operations that facilitate sabotage, regardless of whether the targets are directly U.S. cables.

Fund Taiwan's satellite communication resilience: Through existing security assistance frameworks, Congress should support Taiwan's indigenous satellite development and facilitate partnerships between Taiwan and non-Chinese satellite operators (such as OneWeb and Amazon's Project Kuiper), including the pre-deployment of satellite terminals for emergency use.

Direct unclassified intelligence assessments: Congress should direct the intelligence community to produce an unclassified assessment regarding coordination between China and Russia in sabotaging maritime infrastructure. This will inform allied planning and help build an international consensus on the scale of the threat.

Support the FCC in enforcing new rules: Congress should ensure that the submarine cable landing license rules adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by the end of 2025 are fully and timely enforced. These rules effectively ban Chinese and Russian entities from participating in cable projects that touch U.S. territory.

Execute freedom of navigation operations and joint exercises: The U.S. should conduct freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and hold rapid response exercises with Taiwan's Coast Guard to deter ongoing sabotage. It must be made explicitly clear that systematic attacks on allied submarine infrastructure will be treated as attacks on critical infrastructure and will incur corresponding consequences. This is vital to altering Beijing's calculus.

In addition to his recommendations for the U.S., Hsu also offered advice for Taiwan. He suggested that Taiwan refer to the model of the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to establish a permanent "Undersea Infrastructure Task Force." This group should include the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Coast Guard Administration, private telecommunications companies (like Chunghwa Telecom), and intelligence agencies. Its role would be to coordinate critical actions—such as direct cable repairs when necessary, sharing intelligence on high-risk or suspicious vessels, and unifying incident response—thereby eliminating the bureaucratic gaps that allow gray-zone tactics to succeed.

He further suggested that Taiwan build indigenous submarine cable repair capabilities, such as maintaining a dedicated repair vessel on standby to handle cable breaks. This could be developed as a collaborative initiative with Japan to ensure the collective defense of critical infrastructure, as Japanese submarine cables face similar risks from China's gray-zone warfare. This move would ensure cables can be repaired within days, mitigating the risk of relying on international repair ships that might be unavailable for weeks or even months.

Hsu concluded that the submarine cable threat from China is not a hypothetical, future concern, but a continuously escalating present danger. Since 2023, the frequency and sophistication of cable sabotage incidents around Taiwan have significantly increased. China's investment in specialized technologies indicates it is preparing for more devastating attacks in the event of a military conflict. Furthermore, the emergence of Sino-Russian coordination adds another dangerous dimension. While Taiwan has taken important defensive measures, it cannot face this threat alone.

Hsu believes the long-term solution lies in developing layered alternatives, including low-earth orbit satellite constellations and hardened cable routes, making them less susceptible to disruption by adversaries operating beneath the waves. However, in the short term, the U.S. must make it clear through both words and actions that systematic attacks on allied undersea infrastructure will lead to substantial consequences. Noting that the window for the U.S. to strengthen deterrence, build resilience, and lead an international response before a major crisis occurs is extremely limited, he strongly urged Congress to take immediate action.